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Abstract 
This article explores the extent and limits of non-state authority in international 
affairs. While a number of studies have emphasised the role of state support and 
the ability of strategically situated actors to capture regulatory processes, they 
often fail to unpack the conditions under which this takes place. In order to 
examine the assumption that market power, backed by political support, equates 
with regulatory capture, the article analyses the interplay of political and economic 
considerations in the negotiations to establish worldwide interoperability standards 
needed for the development of Galileo as a genuinely European global navigation 
satellite system under civil control. It argues that industries supported and 
identified as strategic by public actors are more likely to capture standardisation 
processes than those with the largest market share expected to be created by the 
standards. This suggests that the influence of industries in space, air and maritime 
traffic control closely related to the militaro-industrial complex remains dispro-
portionate in comparison to the prospective market of location-based services 
expected to transform business practices, labour relations and many aspects of our 
daily life. 
 
Keywords: Non-state actors, private authority, regulatory capture, standards, 
global navigation satellite systems. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article s’intéresse à l’étendue et aux limites de l’autorité non étatique dans les 
relations internationales. Alors qu’un certain nombre d'études ont souligné le rôle 
du soutien étatique et de la capacité des acteurs stratégiquement positionnés à 
capturer la régulation, elles omettent souvent de décrypter les conditions dans 
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lesquelles se déroule ce processus. En vue de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle le 
pouvoir du marché, au bénéfice du soutient étatique, mène à une capture 
réglementaire, cet article analyse les arbitrages entre considérations politiques et 
économiques dans les négociations en vue de définir des normes internationales 
d’interopérabilité nécessaires à la mise en place du projet européen de système de 
positionnement par satellites Galileo. Les résultats mettent en lumière que les 
industries identifiées comme stratégiques et soutenues par des acteurs publics sont 
plus à même de capturer les processus de normalisation que celles susceptibles de 
bénéficier d’une plus grande part du marché générée par l’adoption de ces 
standards. Ils soulignent d’autre part que l’influence de l’industrie spatiale ou du 
contrôle du trafic aérien et maritime, étroitement lié au complexe militaro-
industriel, demeure disproportionnée en comparaison du marché potentiel que 
représentent les autres services de géolocalisation susceptibles de transformer les 
pratiques commerciales, les relations de travail et d’autres aspects de notre vie 
quotidienne. 
Mots-clefs : acteurs non étatiques, autorité privée, capture de la régulation, 
standards, normes, système de positionnement par satellites
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Introduction 
Global navigation satellite systems (Inside GNSS) have become a key element of 
infrastructure in the development of mobility and transport systems supporting 
public and commercial services. In 2001 the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Space Agency launched the Galileo programme to create a genuinely 
European civilian alternative to the American Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
the Russian GLONASS radionavigation signals, both operated under military control. 
Based on private funding and a complex private-public partnership, the project 
notoriously failed to achieve any significant progress for years. In 2008 a major 
shift in funding and governance structures resuscitated the programme with a 
strong financial and institutional implication of the European Commission.  
This paper analyses the Galileo program from the standpoint of the standards seen 
as essential for the development of this new global navigation satellite system1. It 
differs from conventional analyses, which for the most part examine the signifi-
cance of the project in terms of strategic and sovereignty issues (Barlier, 2008; 
Desingly, 2006; Lewis, 2004; Lindström and Gasparini, 2003; Lungu, 2004; Piéplu 
and Salvatori, 2006). Economic studies regard standards as crucial means to foster 
innovation, reduce product variety, and lower market uncertainty in security and 
quality for the delivery of goods and services to the customer. As information 
available to producers and consumers is more highly asymmetric in markets for 
services than for goods, standards are conceived as market tools to overcome an 
inherent lack of transparency and trust in services prone Yet, those studies fall 
short of understanding the wider institutional environment and power configura-
tions within which standards are expected to bolster and discipline the international 
market of services. 
In contrast, recent scholarship in international political economy views standards as 
privatised regulatory regimes competing with conventional power structures and 
rule-making processes (Borraz, 2007; Clapp, 1998; Graz, 2006; Heires, 2008; 
Mattli and Buthe, 2011; Murphy and Yates, 2009; Prakash and Potoski, 2010). It 
highlights the ability of non-state actors to exert a new form of private authority on 
a range of issues which would previously have fallen within the ambit of state regu-
lations or intergovernmental conventions (Avant, et al., 2010; Büthe, 2010; Cutler, 
et al., 1999; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Grande and Pauly, 2005; Graz and 
Nölke, 2008; Krause Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 2008). Among factors that make 
such new form of power effective, studies emphasise the explicit or implicit recogni-
tion by the state or by public actors such as the European Union (the so-called 
state support hypothesis). Another is the ability of strategically situated actors to 
take advantage of rules devised in small and informal institutional platforms (the 
so-called regulatory capture hypothesis). From this perspective, the weak support 
of the European Commission in the funding and governance structure of the initial 
Galileo project would explain the inability of large multinational firms to identify 
clear areas in which they could benefit from the huge investments needed to 
develop interoperability standards for the European satellite radionavigation 
system. Yet, the political backdrop of the power of non-state actors and large multi-
national firms to set standards within conflicting definitions of market requirements 
deserves further attention. More specifically, the case of Galileo should help us to 
better understand non-state authority in international relations by responding to 
                                                
1 The data presented in this paper are drawn from interviews with top officials in charge of 
standardisation and regulatory policies for Galileo, printed and Internet-documents published 
by the institutions to which the interviewees belong and by other bodies, and as well as the 
specialised press, media and other documentary sources. 
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the following four questions: 1) What exactly is the role of state support, inter-
governmental organisations and supranational institutions for firms competing 
between each other in defining standards? 2) Do firms systematically capture the 
state by taking advantage of informal institutional mechanisms such as standardi-
sation processes? 3) What is the relation between state support and capture in the 
ability of previous state-market relationship to prevail in large technical innovation 
policies? 4) What is the distinct sectoral feature of this relation, in other words, are 
some sectors more able than others to dominate such practices?  
This article provides tentative answers to such questions by exploring the power 
configurations in the development of standards ensuring large scale technical inno-
vation policies in strategic domains. It focuses on the upcoming European global 
navigation satellite system and its expected worldwide interoperability to engage 
the assumption that market power equates with political capture. The article argues 
that the non-state authority of technical standards relies on strong state support 
that gives licence to wide capture practices. Yet, in exploring into more detail the 
relation between state support and capture, it differs from recent analyses of regu-
latory capture outcomes (see e.g. Mattli and Woods, 2009) by providing evidence 
that, even in absence of broad societal claims, industries identified as strategic by 
public actors are more likely to take advantage of standardisation processes than 
those with the largest market share expected to be created by the standards. With 
respect to the creation of Galileo as a global navigation satellite system under full 
civilian control, this suggests that the influence of so-called critical sectors in space, 
air and maritime traffic control is disproportionate in comparison to their market 
share, much smaller than those location-based services expected to transform 
fundamentally business practices, labour relations and many aspects of our daily 
life.  
The article begins with some background on Galileo and the current shift in 
transport, navigation and location systems supported by satellite positioning. The 
second section reviews existing literature on service and interoperability standards 
which play an essential part role in the Galileo programme. The third section de-
velops the theoretical framework and specifies the two core issues of state support 
and regulatory capture around which the empirical analysis of section four is sys-
tematically structured. The conclusion wraps up the argument and draws lessons 
for future research. 
Galileo: some background on a revolution in 
transport, navigation and location services 
Global navigation satellite systems are one of the main pillars of technical innova-
tions in transport, navigation and location services spanning many domains. They 
consist of a constellation of satellites on orbit around the Earth emitting on a 
permanent and worldwide basis signals determining very accurate positions in time 
and space. Those signals can be picked up by receivers operated by different types 
of intermediary- and end-users for determining their exact position (Piéplu and 
Salvatori, 2006). Satellite navigation systems were developed over the last 30 
years or so, originally for military purposes. In the early 1990s, as the American 
GPS and Russian GLONASS moved towards an opening of their systems to the civil 
domain, the European Union saw the need to develop its own system. Satellite 
positioning has become a fundamental instrument for ship and aircraft crews, train 
conductors, professional and private drivers; it has also become a tool increasingly 
used in mining and oil prospecting, agriculture and fisheries, insurance, and many 
other location-based services. According to the European agency supervising the 
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Galileo programme, the concrete application of satellite navigation is extremely 
diverse: it “can relieve traffic conditions by improving the efficiency of vehicle use. 
It can guide people with disabilities or locate shipments, animals and containers. It 
can facilitate civil protection operations in harsh environments, speed up rescue 
operations for people in distress, and provide tools for coastguards and border 
control authorities. It is also a formidable instrument for ‘time stamping' of financial 
transactions, scientific research in meteorology, geodesy, earth movement moni-
toring and many other activities”(European GNSS Supervisory Authority, 2009a). 
Whilst global navigation satellite systems rely on enormous technical challenges, 
such technical innovation and delivery of location-based services raise a number of 
economic, political, and social issues, all of which involve public and private actors 
on a domestic, intergovernmental and transnational basis. These elements con-
tribute to shaping the basic attributes and the larger scope of the services expected 
to be provided by satellite positioning.  The choice made by the European Union to 
keep Galileo under strict civilian control has instigated extra efforts to find ways to 
create a competitive edge with the already existent Russian GLONASS system and 
especially the leading American GPS. A major challenge for Galileo is therefore to 
be able to engage three well-known weaknesses of the GPS. First, the accuracy of 
the transmitted signal is a key issue, as first generations of GPS signals were not 
able to provide accurate data under 20 meters for civilian applications.  The relia-
bility of the signal is another recurring concern: military control over the GPS 
always means a potential denial of access for strategic or diplomatic reasons, as 
Iran or Serbia have known too well for years. Finally, the GPS is also known for a 
number of snags regarding the accessibility to the system in difficult environments, 
such as high-rise buildings or interfering waves. 
 The technical advantage expected from the future European global navigation 
satellite system against its competitors results from the ability to use the signals 
transmitted by several navigation systems together, instead of relying solely on the 
open signals of one system2. In the words of the European body in charge of the 
programme, “with its full complement of satellites, […] European GNSS will deliver 
much more precise and much more reliable services than the American and Russian 
systems. This […] will make possible a whole new and virtually limitless range of 
‘reliability-critical' services, applications and business opportunities” (European 
GNSS Supervisory Authority, 2009a). In order to provide a new range of services 
more accurate, reliable and accessible than those only depending on the prevailing 
American and Russian signals, a crucial feature of the Galileo program is to be 
compatible and interoperable with other global navigation satellite systems. As 
emphasised by a recent report from the International Committee on Global Naviga-
tion Satellite Systems from the UN Office for Outer Space affairs: 
Global and regional system providers agree that at a minimum, all 
GNSS signals must be compatible. To the maximum extent possible, 
open signals and services should also be interoperable, in order to 
maximize benefit to all GNSS users. […] compatibility and interopera-
bility are highly dependent on the establishment of standards for 
service provision and user equipment (International Committee on 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems, 2009, p. 5). 
                                                
2 According to the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems from the 
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, interoperability is defined as: “the ability of 
global and regional navigation satellite systems and augmentations and the services they 
provide to be used together to provide better capabilities at the user level than would be 
achieved by relying solely on the open signals of one system”. See:  
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SAP/gnss/icg.html, accessed 22 August 2009. 
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On empirical grounds, interoperability standards were, from the outset, identified 
as a strategic underpinning of the programme on both a horizontal and vertical 
basis. On a horizontal basis, interoperability standards shape the infrastructure of 
geo-localisation. They define the extent to which distinct satellite radio-navigation 
systems are compatible and can rely on each other. In 2001, a progress report 
prepared for the European Commission indicated that “the main concerns of the US 
authorities relate to ensuring GPS favourable interoperability, competition and 
standardisation arrangements. The Commission aims for a level playing field in 
GNSS overall and maintains that two systems backing each other up are today 
more necessary than ever to reduce vulnerability”3. Today, the European agency 
supervising the Galileo programme considers that European independence was a 
chief reason for launching the programme. It emphasizes, however, that, “by being 
interoperable with GPS and GLONASS, Galileo will also be, in a very real way, the 
new cornerstone of the global navigation satellite system” (European GNSS 
Supervisory Authority, 2009b). On a vertical basis, interoperability standards shape 
location-based services. They specify the requirements for producing and trans-
mitting signals used in material and/or software applications developed for the 
delivery of services to end-users. They are largely used in air, rail, maritime and 
private vehicles traffic control; they have become core functions of mobile phones 
for navigation information; they are expected to become the backbone of the wide 
range of the above-mentioned location-based dedicated services. The European 
Commission and European Space Agency differentiates among this wide variety of 
uses between “critical” or “non critical” applications: critical applications involve 
potential security issues for human life, especially in air, rail and maritime sectors 
and  require the highest level of signal integrity and alerting devices in case of 
failure of the system. In contrast to the so-called “Open service” available for free 
to all users, four classes of signal respond to critical applications with restriction of 
access (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008; European 
Space Agency, 2005). 
Standardising the signals used in satellite navigation and their interoperability with 
other systems providing information to receivers for all sorts of location-based 
services to end-users obviously requires intricate leading-edge scientific knowledge 
in information, communication and navigation technology. Yet, interoperability 
standards for satellite navigation services also hinge on the broader institutional 
environment devised for setting complex technical specifications. The scope and the 
nature of such standards comprehensively affect the current and future organisa-
tion of the capitalist economy. 
Why service and interoperability standards matter 
Standards are voluntary technical specifications explicitly documented and 
published for organising the production and exchange of goods and services. While 
a number of them are defined within the International Organisation for Standardi-
sation (ISO) framework, others result from agreements reached within private 
consortia, such as the Code division multiple access standards of the CDMA 
Development Group competing the GSM technology in radio-telecommunication. 
Such a wide range of complex and informal institutional mechanisms used as tools 
in the organisation of production and exchange of services on a worldwide scale 
have significant impact on the relation between the economic and political spheres 
of our societies.  
                                                
3 Commission Staff Working Paper, Progress Report on the Galileo Programme, Brussels, 5 
December 2001, SEC(2001)1960, p. 5. 
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Scholarship on standards is dominated by business, economic, organisational and 
applied science studies focused on standards in goods and their relations with 
industrial choices, market forces, and technological innovation (Blind and Egyedi, 
2008; Cargill, 1989; Drèze, 1989; OECD, 1999; Swann, 2000; Toth, 1984; Vries, 
1999). The ability to develop a global market of services is not just a matter of 
corporate decisions, economic constraints and technology. A more sociological and 
political perspective assumes that international standardisation requires a distinct 
institutional framework to ensure some order at the transnational level. A number 
of neo-institutionalist studies hinge on rational choice and game theories to 
formalise systematic explanations of cooperative games and conflicts of distribution 
in the institutional framework of standardisation (Abbott and Snidal, 2001; Mattli 
and Buthe, 2011; Mattli, 2001). Some of them build analytical frameworks that 
attempt to overcome models of mere supply and demand of private regulation by 
differentiating between demanders, suppliers, and targets of private regulation 
(Büthe, 2010). Others adopt a reflexive perspective on the socially and historically 
constructed framework of standardisation and its diversity across the globe. They 
provide accounts of the formation of the institutional architecture of standard-
setting, beliefs underpinning standards, democratic controls of so-called 
independent regulatory authorities, conflicts of power in specific negotiations, or 
the broader scope of ISO-like standards (Brunsson, et al., 2000; Egan, 2001; 
Nicolaïdis and Egan, 2001; Schmidt and Werle, 1998). Yet, most of them fail to 
recognise the broader scope and structural nature of power relationships affected 
by standardisation and the role it plays in the organisation of a capitalist world 
economy.  
One of the clearest way in which standards can exert a distinct form of domination 
is in their ability to reinforce path-dependant oligopolistic trajectories in techno-
logical innovation. Studies in technological change and innovation inspired by the 
evolutionary political economy of Schumpeter and Veblen provide significant insight 
on this comprehensive scope of power relations in standardisation processes 
(Callon, 1991; Cowan, 1991; David, 1995). From this point of view, standardisation 
reflects a cumulative and evolutionary process of collective appropriation with 
significant incidence on market power and competition. Short of exclusive exploi-
tation rights included in patents, standards codify technical specifications regarding 
measurement, design, performances, or side effects of products, industrial 
processes, and services that de facto exclude alternative technology and conten-
ding processes. Innovative technology conforming to such standards often includes 
patented technology, especially in large-scale and forward-looking industrial 
policies such as in global navigation satellite systems. Whilst the supporting or 
impeding effects of standards on innovation remains disputable (Liebowitz, et al., 
2002), such a Schumpeter-inspired approach provides a persuasive explanation of 
regulatory capture induced by technological lock-in effects. Large firms dominating 
matured markets are likely to use standards as artefacts for maintaining their 
domination on distinct technologies (Dudouet, et al., 2006, p. 19). Yet, the role of 
states and intergovernmental organisations in supporting the ability of those firms 
to define standards in such ways deserves further attention. Moreover, a crucial 
question remains almost wholly unanswered: do big firms systematically control 
trajectories in technological innovation? If not, which ones do, and how do they rely 
on standards to do so? This prompts us to elaborate further on the non-state 
authority of international standards. 
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 The non-state authority of international standards 
International relations and global political economy scholarship on the rise of non-
state actors, private authority and less conventional forms of sovereignty and 
governance has mushroomed over the last decade (Avant, et al., 2010; Büthe, 
2010; Cutler, et al., 1999; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Grande and Pauly, 
2005; Graz and Nölke, 2008; Krause Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 2008). They 
prompted a shared understanding on the importance of implicit or explicit consent 
– instead of coercion or forceful compliance – in such configurations of power. 
According to Cutler and her co-authors (1999, p. 19), “those subject to the rules 
and decisions being made by private sector actors must accept them as legitimate, 
as the representations of experts and those ‘in authority’”. In the same vein, Djelic 
and Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p. 23) consider that non-state authority enabling 
various forms of transnational governance hinges upon “powerful institutional 
forces that altogether constitute a transnational culture or meaning system”. As 
Djalic and Quack (2010, p. 386-7) emphasise, actors in charge of this new form of 
authority can be understood as transnational communities that “reveal the 
existence of integration, socialisation and control mechanisms. Many of these 
mechanisms appear to be quite similar, in fact, to the mechanisms generally at 
work in the construction of national or even local imagined communities.” 
The non-state authority of international standards reflects a form of structural 
power. The concept of structural power refers to material and discursive structures 
able to affect intentionally and unintentionally the practices of agents. Those able to 
wield this power can modify the general environment for their own benefit. The 
importance of consent in a structural understanding of power on a global scale and 
the extensive concept of the state stretching out to civil society actors have been 
widely recognised in Gramscian-inspired interpretations of hegemony. Robert Cox 
pioneered this line of reasoning in studying large-scale historical structures, as well 
as the smaller nébuleuse of official and unofficial transnational and international 
networks working together towards the formulation of a consensual policy for global 
capitalism (Cox, 1987, 1992). The introductory survey of the International 
Organisation for Standardization by Murphy and Yates explicitly embraces the 
Gramscian analytical lens to explain how low-profile voluntary consensus based 
standards can have significant impact on social regulation (Murphy and Yates, 
2009).  
The Gramscian-inspired IPE scholarship is appropriate to point out the overall 
coherence in which situating the relationship between state and non-state actors in 
standardisation processes. One should be careful, however, not to overstate the 
totalizing effect of structural power (Germain and Kenny, 1998)4. The rise of non-
state actors and less conventional forms of sovereignty is certainly not boundless 
and all-inclusive. From an analytical perspective, a Gramscian-inspired approach 
would single out two distinct features supporting or impeding the power configura-
tions of interoperability standards in the domain of global navigation systems: one 
refers to the role of state support, intergovernmental organisations and supra-
national institutions in the competition between firms to define standards with 
enough consensus to claim wide recognition; the other refers to the particular 
interests behind such claims to general interests in the ability of those state-
supported firms to take advantage of those particular institutional mechanisms. The 
following analysis sketches out those two theoretical issues by examining into more 
detail i) the explicit or implicit recognition by the state; ii) the oligopolistic form of 
                                                
4 For a similar reflection on the G20 in the context of the current crisis, see also (Beeson and 
Bell, 2009) 
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competition favouring state and regulatory capture by strategically situated actors, 
such as large multinational firms. 
i) The ability of non-state actors to cooperate across borders to establish rules and 
standards accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in their definition requires 
an explicit or implicit state recognition. States remain central in the rise of private 
actors in both domestic and international affairs. While there may be sharp 
disagreements as to the sense attributed to state recognition, there is little disa-
greement concerning the overall complementary and subsidiary role taken by 
private actors in regard to state functions. This assumption sharply differs from the 
conventional view according to which “It is the inability or unwillingness of states to 
adopt or enforce [effective government controls over global firms and markets] that 
has contributed to the development and growth of non-state based governance 
institutions” (Vogel, 2009, p. 160). Governments and intergovernmental institutions 
often support and fully recognise the power of non-state actors, who in turn may 
gain legitimate authority. As Sassen (2006, p. 170-1) argues, ‘the redistribution of 
power within the state is a consequence of changes in both the national and the 
international political economy but is also constitutive of those changes’. This 
explains the limits within which this phenomenon should be understood as a purely 
private form of collective action. In short, the question is not so much whether non-
state authority is embedded in state institutions and international institutions, but 
rather in which institutions, at which level, granted with what kind of enforcement. 
As a genuinely European alternative to other global navigation satellite systems, 
Galileo is without doubt a typical case to probe in more detail how the development 
of technical specifications and standards are embedded in existing European 
institutions as well as ad-hoc governance structures specifically created for 
supporting the program.  
ii) The non-state authority of international standards hinges upon an oligopolistic 
form of competition which tends to favour state and regulatory capture. Concerns 
about the ability of special interests or small groups of powerful firms to seize the 
common interest of regulation are central in the wide range of studies focused on 
regulation policy. This is even more the case at the international level, where 
powerful actors have become increasingly proactive in influencing regulation 
outcomes and devising self-regulatory frameworks of the global economy 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Early public choice approaches emphasised the 
importance of self-interest in regulatory policies and how well-organized actors can 
capture the state (Peltzman, 1974; Stigler, 1971; Wilson, 1980). In contrast, 
though following the same rationalist vein, principal-agent models consider that 
regulatory practices of non-elected bodies and private actors are often unable to 
capture the state (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005; Majone, 1996; Vogel and Kagan, 
2004). From an institutional rationalist perspective focused on supply- and 
demand-side conditions influencing regulatory outcomes, Mattli and Woods (2009, 
p. 15) reach a more nuanced position by identifying different outcomes ranging 
from pure capture to common interest regulation; they stress in particular that the 
“supply of proper due process mechanisms is not enough to ensure common 
interest regulation […] In the absence of broad societal demand, industry and other 
concentrated groups targeted for regulation may be the most frequent users of due 
process channels […] and thus may succeed in influencing the fine details of 
regulation to benefit themselves”.  
Such explanations undoubtedly provide fruitful avenues for understanding actors’ 
behaviour and expected outcomes of regulatory policies. Yet, they are all framed 
within a rationalist understanding of collective action and a positivist standpoint on 
knowledge creation. From a reflectivist perspective, actors have only a limited 
capacity to respond to their institutional environment, which itself reflects deeper 
and contradictory structures; similarly, as any given social reality contributes to 
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give meaning to its own existence, knowledge and inference drawn from observed 
facts not only are shaped by those facts, but also contribute to shape them. As 
Cameron and Palan recently stressed, this does not precludes a “possibility of an 
IPE that is simultaneously critical and rigorous both in theoretical and 
methodological terms” (2009, p. 113); to this end, we should assume that our 
conceptual tools can be heuristic and descriptive, and in the same time socially and 
historically-dependant.  
This is certainly a critical point to sharpen up the argument that market power 
equates with political capture. The equation can greatly vary along positions in the 
oligopolistic environment. As we have seen, a Schumpeter-inspired evolutionary 
understanding of standards points towards their use by large firms dominating 
mature markets for capturing technical innovation. In the domain of global naviga-
tion satellite systems, companies providing infrastructure services (i.e. the 
transmission of the signals) and most industries involved in the hardware and soft-
ware instruments of satellite navigation (i.e. receptors) are not situated on the 
same segment of market maturity as those delivering commercial location-based 
services to end-users (i.e. positioning and mobile-related applications used for 
instance in emergency services). Most companies providing infrastructure and navi-
gation services belong to the more mature market of the militaro-industrial 
complex than those new firms providing highly personalised and mobile information 
to end-users for dedicated location-based services. As Mügge (2006) has shown in 
much detail with regard to the financial sector, it is much easier for private actors 
to promote self-regulation and non-state forms of standardisation when only a few 
big players remain in place after having settled early competitive struggles for the 
control of a new market. In this perspective, incumbent firms belonging to mature 
markets tend to be more prone to political capture than those struggling in highly 
competitive innovative markets. The following analysis provides further evidence of 
the significance of an oligopolistic environment, characterised by limited competi-
tion between large firms related to past industrial space policies closely associated 
with national militaro-industrial complexes and Raison d’Etat.  
In brief, the analysis of how the non-state authority of international standards can 
be effective requires a detailed understanding of the explicit or implicit state and 
intergovernmental recognition and the form of competition supporting the ability of 
market power to equate with political power. The next section examines the extent 
to which these issues affect the development of the interoperability standards 
required for launching a European global navigation satellite system expected to 
dispute the first mover’s advantage of the American GPS system.  
Galileo and its search for standards 
In this section, we focus on three core issues underpinning the development of Gal-
ileo standards: 
(i) The competition between European private firms in the development of 
Galileo’s geo-localisation infrastructure, which shows the ability of state-
supported firms to indirectly capture standardisation processes, without 
participating in the formal institutions governing the project; 
(ii) The development of horizontal interoperability standards between 
competitors in global navigation satellite systems, which shows that a 
strong market share can, but does not necessarily, ensure dominance in 
the standardisation process; 
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(iii) The development of vertical interoperability standards between Galileo 
and location-based services for end-users, whose ability to influence the 
standardisation process is inversely proportional to their market share. 
(i) Public actors such as European Union (EU), European Space Agency (ESA) and 
Eurocontrol have been driving the Galileo project since its beginnings in the 1990s. 
European states were aware of the economic, technological and political 
ascendancy that American space systems could gain in the context of the demise of 
the Cold War. Two reports of European Commission and one of the main lobbying 
organisation of European space industries (High Level Industry Working Group – 
HLIWG) emphasised three threats: a “major dependence” of Europe on the 
American military GPS system, a lack of European companies in the international 
GNSS market, and poor perspectives for European industry to “capture the huge 
associated market for user equipment” (Bildt, et al., 2000; European Commission, 
1994, 1996; HLIWG, 1996). As Lungu points out, “European elites have been 
worried since the late 1980s that they would not be a winner in the kind of 
Schumpeterian competition that characterizes typical technology-intensive 
industries such as the aerospace” (2004, p. 382). European Commission and some 
European countries considered a solution was urgently needed to avoid the loss of 
critical growth markets by space industry firms. After various declarations of inte-
rest, the European Commission officially launched the project in 1999.  
The initial project designed a Public Private Partnership (PPP) and the delivery of a 
concession to a private firm, with a development phase funded by the European 
Union (Mörth, 2007). In 2002 the European Union and the European Space Agency 
(ESA) created the Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) to be in charge of the develop-
ment phase and of the completion of future concession assignation contracts 
(Council of the European Union, 2002). While private firms interested in the GNSS 
market were supposed to buy shares of the capital of the GJU, not a single one 
eventually did (Council of the European Union, 2002). The GJU, nevertheless, 
published in 2003 the call for the concession authorizing the deployment and 
operational management of Galileo. Two consortia of space industry firms showed 
their interest: Inavsat and Eurely.5 As each European state tried to promote its 
national champion, the two consortia were unable to collaborate and GJU could not 
make a choice between them (AFP, 2002; Cour des Comptes Européenne, 2009; 
Eurely & Inavsat, 2005a, b; Sparaco, 2003). They eventually merged to create 
Euro-GNSS, which negotiated in 2005 a 20 year concession (European Commission, 
2006). However, the new partners continued to disagree on their respective share 
in the project, which was marked with many overlaps in jurisdictions and work 
packages, as well as increasing doubts on the financial profitability of Galileo6. As a 
result, Euro-GNSS failed to achieve its mandate within the agreed schedule. In 
2007 the European Commission cancelled the concession agreement, aborted the 
initial PPP project, and made a U-turn to fund the development, deployment and 
operational phases of Galileo for 3,4 billions euros (European Commission, 2007). 
The whole project was cut into six packages, to be attributed as public 
procurements to European space industry firms (European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2008). Under the new framework, all intellectual property 
                                                
5 Inavsat was made of Immarsat Ventues (G-B), EADS Space Services (Germany/France), 
and Thales (France). Eurely was made of Alcatel (France), Finmeccanica (Italy), Aena 
(Spain), and Hispasat (Spain). For further information, see: (Alcatel Alenia Space, 2005; 
EADS, 2005) 
6 Eero Ailio, Administrator of Galileo External Relations of the European Commission, 
interview with authors, 5 May 2008, Brussels; René Oosterlinck, Director of the Galileo 
Programme and Navigation-related Activities (D/NAV), European Space Agency (ESA), 
interview with authors, 24 July 2008, Paris. 
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rights related to the standards developed for Galileo belong to the European Union 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008). 
What lessons can be drawn from this story? First, a good deal of the initial failure of 
the project between 2002 and 2007 under the management of the public/private 
body Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) can be explained by weak state support. 
Without public funding from the European Union and clear prospects on the 
business model of Galileo, future earnings extracted from a potential rent remained 
uncertain for private firms involved in the project. There was no point for orga-
nising themselves to capture the body created to launch the project. Instead, space 
industry firms of the militaro-industrial complex struggled in their own consortium –
Inavsat and Eurely – to develop their own standards for Galileo. In other words, 
private firms tried to capture the project outside the GJU formal structure to gain 
more significant control over the definition of Galileo’s standards.  
It is precisely such inability of private actors to cooperate that led the European 
Commission to reinforce state support. Yet the new framework devised to regain 
control of Galileo does not mean a total loss of influence for space industry firms. 
On the contrary, a particular institutional agreement provides an enhanced state 
support to national firms of the military-industrial complex closely associated with 
security concerns. In 2007, the European Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy Council set up a distinct juridical framework, which strongly restricts the 
ability of extra-Community contractors to provide their technology to set Galileo 
standards. According to the European Commission officer in charge of Galileo 
external relations, non-European firms could only have access to the market if 
“they supply a clear added value in terms of quality or cost”7. A 2008 Regulation of 
the Parliament and the European Council blessed this assumption:  
“open access and fair competition throughout the industrial 
supply chain and the balanced offering of participation 
opportunities to industry at all levels, [...] should be pursued 
across Member States” and “European industries should be 
permitted to rely on non-European sources for certain 
components and services where substantial advantages in terms 
of quality and costs are demonstrated, taking account, however, 
of the strategic nature of the programmes and of European Union 
security and export control requirements”(European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2008). 
In addition, the European Commission gave particular attention to procurement 
procedures of each segment of the project in the “Galileo technology control 
regime”. The document mentions, among other things, the type and nationality of 
industrial firms allowed to be involved in the project (European Commission, 2008). 
According to Coste, “80% of the space technology market is an institutional 
market. That is to say it is built on public procurement which are assigned 
exclusively to domestic industries” (2005, p. 22). As Zervos and Siegel (2005, p. 
171) explain, 
 “European and American firms encounter almost no domestic 
competition in their respective domestic space industries. 
However, they do encounter competition in commercial space 
markets, such as launching services, telecommunication 
satellites, and remote sensing products. As a result, each firm is 
assumed to behave as a monopolist in the domestic public space 
                                                
7 Eero Ailio, Administrator of Galileo External Relations of the European Commission, 
interview with authors, 5 May 2008, Brussels. 
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market it is faced with, and as a duopolist, in competition with 
the other firm in the commercial space market.”  
These pro forma Galileo provisions contradict common EU law, in particular the 
Treaty on European Union, which promotes free competition (European Union, 
2008). They tend to create an oligopolistic environment ensuring preferential 
treatment to large European companies and their subsidiaries. Insofar as European 
space industry firms (e.g. EADS, Finmeccanica, Thales, etc.) that control the 
technology standards required for the new GNSS benefit from this tailored juridical 
framework, they did not need to engage themselves financially into GJU. They just 
had to wait for orders paid by the European Union to provide their technologies! 
Moreover, despite a formal European Union ownership, space industry firms will 
keep the right to use the standards created for Galileo for their own products free 
of charge (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2008)8. This 
form of state-supported capture presents the huge advantage of allowing private 
firms to develop patented standards for which they will get a competitive 
advantage without having to pay for their development – an industrial model far 
from the common understanding of entrepreneurial risk taking. This may well 
explain the relative lack of concern of European space industry companies to 
directly control technological and operational aspects of Galileo. The capture here is 
indirect, without any need to be part of the formal institutions governing the 
project. This is how the Galileo legal regime has led to a de facto capture process 
for state-supported firms of the European space and militaro-industrial complex. 
(ii) The launch of Galileo by the European Union follows the implementation of 
other similar systems, such as the American GPS or the Russian GLONASS. 
Interoperability on a so-called horizontal basis is a cornerstone for newcomers in 
order to be able to use the signals transmitted by other navigation systems. 
Interoperability agreements are indeed crucial to insure a better accuracy (more 
satellites available to the end-users), reliability (redundant satellites constellations 
and use of common radio frequencies without interference), and accessibility 
(compatibility between different satellites constellations). This technology- and 
market-driven requisite reflects a paradoxical competitive interdependence, 
including significant issues on standards and “grandfather rights” of the first mover. 
This invariably generates a strong dissymmetry between contractors. According to 
Creti et Perrot (1997), actors in a weak position, such as newcomers, can only 
consider their survival by building bridges – e.g. by adopting common standards – 
with their competitors. In contrast, older players can take advantage of this context 
by guiding their competitors’ choices and thus perpetuating their market 
domination. In the case of Galileo and GPS, Americans initially offered to sell to 
their European counterparts a “ready to use” GNSS fully compatible with GPS, 
which clearly promoted their own space industry and maintained their control over 
any potential competitor9. The European Commission turned down the offer, but 
accepted in a 2004 agreement to adopt CDMA – the signal standard of GPS – for 
future developments of Galileo  (European Union & United States of America, 
2004). This allows joint use of both GPS and Galileo signals on a same receiver to 
make the two satellites’ constellations compatible mainly for reliability purposes. 
For its part, the Russian GLONASS initially tried to adopt another signal standard 
(FDMA) incompatible with GPS and Galileo. However, in 2008, Russian officials also 
decided to implement the CDMA standard jointly with their FDMA in order to be 
compatible with most of the end-users receivers (Engelsberg, et al., 2008; Inside 
                                                
8 This was fully explained to us by Eric Chatre, Head of Mission and System Definition, 
European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA), interview with authors, 7 May 2008, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
9 Eero Ailio, Administrator of Galileo External Relations of the European Commission, 
interview with authors, 5 May 2008, Brussels. 
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GNSS, 2007). Thus, unified interoperability standards exert a distinct market 
pressure on new GNSS entrants for setting compatible standards. Does this, 
however, inexorably lead to a capture of the market by the first movers of large 
technical innovations? The Galileo project provides some evidence that this 
assumption may be nuanced.  
GPS is undoubtedly the main and sole current GNSS which provides signals used by 
all kinds of end-users all over the world. In regard of the overwhelming 
predominance of the GPS, the wisdom of creating a new GNSS like Galileo has 
often been questioned among European official circles (Harrison, 2001; Sample, 
2007). Apart from strategic and sovereignty issues, and even if some GPS 
standards such as the CDMA are included in Galileo, why does the European Union 
need its own GNSS technology? From an abstract political economy perspective 
bringing together Schumpeter- and Gramscian-inspired approaches, matured 
industries whose standards control the largest market share (i.e. American space 
industry firms) are likely to capture the standardisation processes. Yet, a careful 
empirical investigation of the Galileo project proves that this abstract view should 
be nuanced. As shown above, the development of European GNSS technologies was 
defined as a major issue by the European countries since the beginning of the 
1990s. After the failure of the initial arrangement, this led European space industry 
companies to enjoy a strong state support granted by a tailored legislation and 
strong financial backing to develop their own technologies (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2008). As a result, European companies could 
count on an effective system keeping at bay the domination from American state-
supported GPS providers. Even if some American companies were involved in minor 
parts of Galileo packages, European space firms that were previously unfamiliar 
with GNSS standards succeeded in undermining the first-mover’s capture 
advantage of US firms in the global GNSS market. This is considerable evidence to 
reinforce the case that a strong state support is likely to allow private firms to 
overcome market capture of historic providers in a specific sector. 
iii) Securing vertical interoperability with location-based services for end-users is 
the third key issue underpinning the significance of standards for a successful 
development of the Galileo program. On a vertical basis, interoperability hinges on 
the acceptance by location-based dedicated services to receive signals from 
different GNSS into a sole technical device – a key point for the commercial success 
or failure of the project. However, as we have seen in section 1, the role of distinct 
communities of users in the definition of Galileo’s standards differs significantly. 
Some applications, such as in civil aviation, rail transportation, and maritime traffic, 
are designated by the EU as “critical” for security reasons. They represent, 
however, only a fraction of all users. For instance, at the beginning of the project, 
civil aviation was expected to reach only 1% of the market share (Blanchard, 2003, 
p. 96). 
In contrast, non-critical commercial or public applications in location-based 
services, such those related to mobile phones or car navigation systems, were 
expected to make up respectively about 32% and 42% of all users (Flament and 
Ludwig, 2003, p. 12). More recent data on four sectors defined as “key market 
segments” by the European body in charge of Galileo estimate at 57% the future 
Galileo market in road navigation and 39% in location-based services – e.g. mobile 
phone services –, but  only at 2,8% in aviation and 1,2% in agriculture (Kennes, et 
al., 2009). Quite surprisingly, the ability of each community of users to define key 
features of the service to be delivered is inversely proportional to their market 
share. 
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The European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) set up a so-called bottom-up 
process to directly involve “critical” users in the definition of signal standards. The 
process relies on the ability of the most important international organizations of the 
sector, in particular the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to forward 
to Galileo promoters requirements in terms of performance of the system and 
technical standards (Standards and Recommended Practices – SARP) before 
authorising users such as devices producers or airlines companies to implement 
Galileo’s signals for civil aviation applications (OACI, 2004). The requirements are 
studied by GSA and ESA in order to be transmitted to firms in charge of the 
development of Galileo. Most important requests of “critical” users lead to an 
adaptation of the system’s standards. The role of space industry firms in these 
sectors is significant, since they are often involved in the conception of Galileo’s 
infrastructural standards and of the devices used in applications such as civil 
aviation (e.g. EADS, Finmeccanica, Thales, etc.). According to high-level officials in 
charge of the program, the United States even appoint industry representatives in 
international organizations such as ICAO in order to influence the definition 
processes of standards’ requirements and to ensure that their space industry firms 
will not be affected by such requests10. 
In contrast, non-critical public and commercial users, such as mobile phone or car 
navigation system manufacturers (e.g. Nokia, Sony Ericsson, TomTom, etc.), are 
not directly involved in the definition of Galileo’s standards. Here, the GSA relies on 
a so-called top-down process, according to which GNSS standards are forwarded to 
industry fora, such as the Open Mobile Alliance or the 3rd Generation Partnership 
Project11. In general, if the high level of requirement of “critical users” is reached, 
GSA considers that the signal standards provided by Galileo should meet the needs 
of other users’ communities as well12. This is why GSA does not modify signal 
standards for non-critical users’ needs. In this sense, GSA assumes the role of 
gatekeeper. However, sectors like location-based services or traffic management 
and security are particularly important for public recognition and a mass-market 
use of Galileo. This brings into focus the announcement made in 2009 by the GSA 
to create with the support of the European Commission a “Market Development 
Department” in charge of all issues related to European GNSS market access 
(Kennes, et al., 2009). There is little doubt that this initiative reflects the dual need 
of Galileo’s market: a genuinely European civilian GNSS must target a mass market 
of public users in order to be financially viable and symbolically recognised as a 
major and popular GNSS, yet it must simultaneously adapt its services to specific 
“critical” users in order to be technologically recognised as a performing and 
reliable GNSS. 
“Critical use” as defined by the EU is thus likely to generate greater capture of 
standardisation processes by industries, even if their expected market share is low. 
Privileged arenas for capture are inter-governmental organisations such as the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). The fact that “critical use” involves state-supported industries 
defending their interests in international organisations provides us with some useful 
insights into this particular aspect of non-state authority in standardisation 
processes. Moreover, sectors defined as “critical” (e.g. civil aviation) are usually the 
                                                
10 Eric Chatre, Head of Mission and System Definition, European GNSS Supervisory Authority 
(GSA), interview with authors, 7 May 2008, Brussels; Eero Ailio, Administrator of Galileo 
External Relations of the European Commission, interview with authors, 5 May 2008, 
Brussels. 
11 See : www.openmobilealliance.org/ (accessed 13 November 2008) and 
http://www.3gpp.org (accessed 12 January 2009). 
12 Eric Chatre, Head of Mission and System Definition, European GNSS Supervisory Authority 
(GSA), interview with authors, 7 May 2008, Brussels. 
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same as those in which state-supported space industry firms are involved. Such 
firms benefit from their oligopolistic position in defining standards, as well as in 
designing the needs of critical users. This suggests that the categorisation of Galileo 
users is not only driven by security reasons, but also by strategic industrial policy 
choices. In contrast, firms lacking state support are left with few levers of influence, 
even if they are expected to drive most of the market share in the use of Galileo’s 
standards. We are thus witnessing the paradoxical situation where the need for 
Galileo to have a broad base of users in order to be recognised as a major 
international GNSS is not captured by those firms expected to benefit from the 
huge market of location based services, but by those old domestic-oriented 
champions of the space-related militaro-industrial complex. 
Conclusions 
The relevance of this study rests on the importance of technical standards as non-
state forms of authority in market creation and global regulatory issues that not 
only need state support, but also supposes a peculiar form of rent seeking. By 
focusing on the interoperability standards ensuring the development of the geo-
localisation services of Galileo and their link with other global navigation satellite 
systems, the article highlights the ability of non-state actors to gain a new form of 
authority on a range of issues which would previously have fallen within the ambit 
of state regulations or intergovernmental agreements. The ability of the most 
strategically situated actors to define market structures for large-scale technical 
innovations with worldwide implications still depends on state support. This study 
provides further insights, however, on the conditions under which state support 
takes place and non-state actors capture standardisation and regulatory processes. 
It examines the limits of market power, backed by political support, to equate with 
regulatory capture. 
What are the wider implications of this analysis? On a theoretical basis, the initial 
failure of the first Galileo Joint Undertaking in 2002-7 has shown that without 
considerable state support, industrial consortia remain unable to organise 
themselves sufficiently to capture the regulatory outcome of technical innovation 
surrounding the creation of a new market. In contrast, the GNSS Supervisory 
Authority set up in 2008 has benefited from the strong political backing of the 
European Commission to implement a new framework which has allowed a de facto 
capture process for state-supported firms of the European space and militaro-
industrial complex. Our study also specifies neo-Schumpeterian and institutional 
assumptions on path-dependant oligopolistic innovation trajectories. While 
American firms controlling a wide range of technologies closely related to the GPS 
undoubtedly benefit from a first mover’s advantage in technical innovation, the 
successful political backing of the new Galileo framework allowed European firms to 
contribute to Galileo standards and enter the market. The development of 
horizontal interoperability standards between competitors provides significant 
evidence that state support can allow new entrant firms to overcome market 
capture by historic providers. Moreover, our detailed analysis of the vertical 
interoperability of standards between the infrastructure of satellite geo-localisation 
technology and location-based services for end-users shows that further 
disaggregation of industry practices is necessary to fully understand regulatory 
capture. Emerging firms expect to predominantly benefit from the new market of 
location based services, instead of the old national champions of the space-related 
militaro-industrial complex; yet, they are unable to capture the nascent 
interoperability standards. Unlike a straightforward structural understanding of 
capture, this suggests that the ability of market actors to set standards in their own 
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favour can be inversely proportional to their market share. Political support helped 
to undermine American-led path-dependant trajectories in shaping the horizontal 
interoperability of standards between competing satellite navigation systems; in 
contrast, within the European environment, it reinforced another path-dependency 
in setting vertical interoperability standards to the detriment of location-based 
services. Political support played a predominant role in orienting standardisation 
and regulatory capture in both cases.  
On the whole, the power of firms to set in their own favour the technical 
specifications underpinning new markets cannot be understood independently from 
how states and political institutions frame their support. This straightforward 
assumption brings us back to two major issues surrounding the debate on what the 
IPE field is or should be (Blyth, 2009; Cohen, 2007; Phillips and Weaver, 2010)13. 
First, in sharp contrast to the mainstream US-style understanding of political action 
affecting economic transactions on the international stage, it reinforces the so-
called British or continental perspective on IPE that has a more pervasive definition 
of power relations. This ontological view of power has roots in a conceptualisation 
of politics more process- than outcome-oriented and allows investigations into a 
wider range of state-society relations. This is what Hay and Marsh (1999) meant 
over ten years ago when they emphasised that putting the P back into international 
political economy supposes to “interrogate power relations in any social context”. 
The complexities and far-reaching implications of the European global navigation 
satellite system are clearly a case in point. Second, from a methodological 
perspective, our careful empirical investigation of how market power can equate 
with regulatory capture lends support, this time, to calls made by a number of 
scholars to take American empiricist tradition more seriously. While constructivists 
long ago emphasised that structures can only be instituted by the practices of 
agents, the implication here ties in with the critical and historicist tradition of the 
so-called British and continental IPE. It is from this standpoint that this article 
endorses an approach echoing the ‘critical empiricism’ called for by Cameron and 
Palan (2009). In shedding light on one among many messy issues of the real world, 
it helps to identify new routes to overcome the empiricist/structuralist divide in 
knowledge production and validation among IPE scholars. 
                                                
13 See also the two following special issues of New Political Economy, “The ‘British School’ of 
International Political Economy”, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2009), pp. 313-400 and Review of 
International Political Economy, “Not So Quiet on the Western Front: The American School of 
IPE”, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 1-143.  
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